by Novruz Mammadov

22 April 2010, Thursday

Recently, the Turkish media has widely discussed Azerbaijan’s role in Turkish-Armenian relations.

Many commentators argue that in order to become a global player Turkey must mend ties with Armenia, and they accuse Azerbaijan of thwarting this process. Some even claim that Turkey has made its foreign policy hostage to Azerbaijan’s demands. Most of these arguments do not reflect reality.

Over the last two decades, the major impediments in Turkish-Armenian relations have been the Armenian campaign for the recognition of the genocide claims and Armenia’s refusal to publicly recognize the Turkish border. Turkey’s decision to close its border with Armenia in 1993 in response to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces has set another milestone in the relations. On the other hand, under the influence of their Armenian lobbies, the US and European countries have made significant efforts to help Armenia, ignoring its continuing occupation in Azerbaijani territories. Recently, the US has been using the possible recognition of the Armenian genocide claims as a threat to pressure Turkey to open the border without any preconditions.

Three main arguments are used to compel both Turkey and Azerbaijan to accept a plan that would only benefit Armenia. Firstly, the Turkish-Armenian problem has nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh, and hence these two issues should be treated separately. Secondly, the opening of the border will eliminate the genocide issue, which is a major problem in the US-Turkish relations. Thirdly, both Turkey and Azerbaijan will benefit from the opening of the border because this will contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

First of all, we believe that as two states with the same people, Turkey and Azerbaijan bear the moral responsibility to defend each other’s interests. Those who demand that Turkey ignore the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be reminded that many Armenian fighters in the conflict, by their own account, were driven by the desire to “settle scores with the Turks” and expelled close to a million people from their lands by undertaking massacres such as the one in Khojali. These people were victims of ethnic cleansing because they were Turks, and naturally they expected support from Turkey. The Turks’ desire to consider the most important problem of their Azerbaijani brethren should be clear to American officials who prepare genocide recognition bills and pressure countries across the ocean in order to satisfy their relatively minor Armenian population.

On the other hand, it is not plausible that the opening of the border will relieve Turkey from the genocide problem. The Armenian diaspora considers the genocide issue its lifeline and an important political tool. Armenian officials have also embraced the recognition of the genocide claims as a national cause and continue to support it. This issue has been used as a political tool both within US domestic politics and in its relations with Turkey. It is ironic that those who use the genocide card to pressure Turkey to open the border today argue these claims will be shelved with the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkey’s major concern should be the scenario lurking behind the recognition campaign, as it is well known that the other two pillars of the Armenian cause are reparation and territorial claims.

Those who claim the opening of the border might contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by leading to a moderation in Armenian politics or argue that Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan strengthens our position and makes us irreconcilable in the negotiations are apparently not well informed on this issue. In order to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Azerbaijan has closely cooperated with the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); however, so far the negotiations have been futile because of Armenia’s intransigence. Armenia’s track record in the negotiations creates the impression that it wants to keep the conflict unresolved as an excuse for an indefinite occupation. If the expected concession from the Azerbaijani side is our acknowledgement of the occupation, it will not happen under any conditions. The closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain a major factor that might compel Armenia to take a constructive step for the resolution of the conflict. Opening the border before Armenia takes any steps in this direction would be a major blow to the peace prospects and Azerbaijan.

Lastly, it is simply not true that Azerbaijan has not supported Turkey. Azerbaijan was not with Turkey in the recent nuclear security summit because it was not invited, and in fact, the media interpreted this as yet another manifestation of US efforts to exclude Azerbaijan from Turkish-Armenian relations. Azerbaijani officials consider raising and defending issues important to Turkey a responsibility, and our countries have consistently taken a unanimous position on almost every issue in international forums. Since its independence, Azerbaijan had to fight against the use of the Armenian genocide claims as a political instrument because we have suffered most from these claims. Armenia has successfully overshadowed its occupation and ethnic cleansing in Azerbaijani territories with an active genocide campaign in the West, and today, it is painful to observe that this tactic has started to succeed even in Turkey.

The relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are based on strong traditions and mutual interests. Over the last 20 years, Turkey has been Azerbaijan’s gate to the West, and Azerbaijan has played the same role in Turkey’s relations with Central Asia. Notwithstanding great pressures, Azerbaijan insisted on building its major oil and gas pipelines through Turkey toward the West. Standing by Azerbaijan during difficult times, Turkey has earned the esteem and sympathy of the Azerbaijani people. We consider the current external pressures another test that will further strengthen the ties between our peoples and countries. 

*Ambassador Novruz Mammadov is the director of the department of foreign relations in the presidential administration of Azerbaijan.